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THE MARITAL RAPE 
EXEMPTION: A 




For the husband cannot be guilty of a rape com-
mitted by himself upon his lawful wife for by 
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract 
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto 
her husband which she cannot retract.1 
With this cryptic pronouncement, the seventeenth century 
jurist, Matthew Hale, laid the foundation for the common law 
marital rape exemption.2 The marital rape exemption gives legal 
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an 
act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his 
wife.3 While the marital rape exemption protects the husband 
from criminal charges of rape, it imposes harsh physical;' emo-
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1847). 
2. Hale appears to have been the first to articulate what later would become an 
accepted legal principle, that a husband cannot be charged with raping his wife. Com-
ment, The Marital Exception to Rape: Past, Present and Future, 1978 DET. C.L. REv. 
261, 262. Hale's determination of the law in this area was without other explicit support-
ing authority. Regina v. Clarence [1886-1890] All E.R. 133, 152, 22 Q.B.D. 23, 57 (1889) 
(reversing a conviction for assault and infliction of grievous bodily harm by a husband on 
his wife for having sexual intercourse with her when he had venereal disease). After cit-
ing Hale's statement that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife, the author of 
the opinion commented: "[t]he authority of Lord Hale C.J., on such a matter is undoubt-
edly as high as any can be, but no other authority is cited by him for this proposition 
and I should hesitate before I adopted it." [d. (Field, J., dissenting). 
3. Notwithstanding the presence of the other elements of rape-sexual penetration, 
lack of consent, and force-the husband cannot be prosecuted for rape. See generally 3 
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 283-290 at 1-43 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1978) [hereinafter cited 
as WHARTON]. For a typical example of a state statute embodying the marital rape ex-
emption, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West Supp. 1980). 
4. Physical violence accompanying rape in addition to the act of rape may include 
beating, choking, successive attacks and the use of weapons. One study of rape found 
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tional,5 and legal consequences8 on the woman who is the victim 
of her husband's forcible sexual assaults. The marital rape ex-
emption not only robs a married woman of the right to control 
her body vis-a-vis her husband;r but also disregards the serious 
harm suffered by the victim of rapes and denies a married 
woman the right, which a single woman has, to legal recourse 
against her attacker. 9 
This Comment reviews the statutory status of the marital 
rape exemption, examines its historical origins, and critically 
analyzes the legal justifications supporting the exemption. The 
final section discusses the relation between the marital rape ex-
emption and a woman's constitutional right of privacy. 
I. STATUTORY STATUS 
Current statutory rape laws reflect the ubiquitous tenacity 
of the marital rape exemption. Most states statutorily provide, 
in varying degrees, for spousal immunity from rape charges.1o 
Some states limit the exemption under certain conditions,11 
whereas others extend the exemption to unmarried couples.12 
ible Rape, in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 51 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). See notes 176-77 infra and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of this violence on the victim. 
5. For a discussion of the complex emotional and psychological harm resulting from 
rape, see, e.g., Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FORcmLE RAPE: THE 
CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER. (D. Chappell, R. Geis, G. Geis eds. 1977). See 
also notes IS0-IS2 infra and accompanying text. 
6. The legal consequences include denial of the right to have her attacker charged 
with rape and violation of her constitutional right of privacy. See part IV infra for a 
discussion of a married woman's constitutional right to privacy and the marital rape 
exemption. 
7. See notes 159-173 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
S. See notes 4, 5 supra and notes 174-182 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Rape is a statutory crime in every state. WHARTON, supra note 3, § 2S3, at 2. 
10. See notes 15-25 infra and accompanying text, for citation and discussion of the 
various state statutes. Inasmuch as this Comment is concerned with statutory marital 
rape exemptions, those states which do not statutorily provide for the exemption but 
which may rely on the common law to the same effect are not discussed. See Note, The 
Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spousal Abuse, IS J. FAM. L. 565, 5S0 
(19S0) [hereinafter cited as Legal Sanction of Spousal Abuse], for mention of these 
states. 
11. These conditions include separation under a court order, see note 17 infra and 
accompanying text: separation and initiation of legal proceedings for divorce or separa-
tion, see note IS infra and accompanying text; or infliction of physical injury, see note 22 
infra and accompanying text. 
12. Some states include unmarried cohabitants in the exemption. See note 23 infra. 
Other states extend inlmunity from first degree rape charges to voluntary social compan-
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Despite variations in application, thirty-eight states statutorily 
provide for application of the exemption if the couple is 
cohabitating.13 
The most restrictive statutes unconditionally bar a woman 
from bringing rape charges against her husband. I. These states 
expressly exclude marital rape from their rape statutes. lIS Under 
these statutes, a husband may not be charged with raping his 
wife while the couple is legally married. Thus, until a: woman 
obtains a final divorce decree, she is not legally protected from 
her husband's forcible sexual assaults. Ie Other states statutorily 
provide that the exemption does not apply where the rape oc-
curs after the parties are living apart and have obtained a court-
ordered separation. l '1 Seven states require both that the parties 
ions. See notes 36-37 infra and accompanying text. 
13. See notes 14, 15, 17-19, & 23 infra and accompanying text for citation and dis-
cussion of these statutes. The following states provide for application of the exemption if 
the couple is cohabitating: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
14. The exemption sometimes is expressed in a section defining language used in the 
rape provision. For example, one code defines "female" for the purposes of its rape stat-
ute as "[a]ny female who is not married to the actor." ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (1977). 
Other codes incorporate the exemption in the definition of rape. "Rape is an act of sex-
ual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife .••• " KAN. STAT. § 21-
3502(1) (Supp. 1980). 
15. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (Smith-Hurd 
1979), KAN. STAT. § 21-3502(1) (Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 
1958); S.D. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1980); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 
21.02(a) (Vernon 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 9A-44-040 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 (1977). 
16. If, after she obtains a final divorce decree, her (ex-) husband rapes her, a woman 
may charge him with rape. State v. Baugh, 402 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. 1966). 
17. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975): "[S]pouses living apart under 
a judicial decree are not married"; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West Supp. 1980); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030.2 (Vernon Supp. 
1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (alternately a written separa-
tion agreement specifically providing that the husband may be subject to the rape stat-
ute will render the exemption inoperative); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01.2 (1976); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (Supp. 1980) requires the couple to be living apart and a divorce 
granted, although no final decree is required. The limitation on prosecution of a spouse 
for sexual assault only applies to first degree forcible sexual assault. [d. There is no lim-
iting language in the statute for second degree sexual assault. [d. at 11-37-4; S.C. CODE 
§ 16-3-658 (Supp. 1980) (Ua person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct • . • if 
the victim is his legal spouse, unless the couple are living apart, by reason of a court 
order"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407(1) (Supp. 1979); WYo. STAT. § 6-4-307 (1977) (pro-
3
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be living apart and that one spouse has /iled for separation, sep-
arate maintenance, annulment, or divorce before the exemption 
is inapplicable. IS Some states only require that the couple be liv-
ing apart to nullify the exemption.I9 Of these states, three pro-
vide alternatively, that the exemption is inoperative if the hus-
band or wife has filed for separation, separate maintenance, or 
divorce.2o One state which disallows the exemption if the couple 
is living apart, alternatively disallows the exemption if the 
couple is living together under a written separation agreement or 
a court-ordered separation.21 Another state permits prosecution 
of the husband for rape if the couple is cohabitating and the 
accused caused physical injury to the victim.22 A number of 
states extend the exemption to unmarried cohabitants.23 
vides, alternatively, that issuance of a restraining order will void the marital exemption). 
18. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(b) (Burns 1979) states: "This section [defining the 
criminal offense of rape] does not apply to [forced] sexual intercourse between spouses 
unless a petition for dissolution of the marriage is pending and the spouses are living 
apart"; MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520(1) (West Supp. 1979-1980) states: "A person 
does not commit sexual assault under this act if the victim is his or her legal spouse, 
unless the couple are living apart and one of them has filed for separate maintenance or 
divorce." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1980); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.373(3) 
(1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L) (Supp. 1980) (no mention that the parties 
must be living apart and provides, alternatively, that a written separation agreement 
nullifies the exemption); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39.3709 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940-225(6) (West Supp. 1980). 
19. ALASKA STAT. § 1l.41.445(a)(1) (1978); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(4) (West 
1978); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1978) (also requires the "intent to live apart"); 
IDAHO § 18-6107 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979) (allows for prosecution of 
sexual assault in the third degree if spouses are living apart); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17A, § 251(1)(A) (West Pamph. 1979) (for purposes of the rape statute, "'[s]pouse' 
means a person legally married to the actor, and does not include a legally married per-
son living apart from the actor under a de facto separation"); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. 
§ 45-5-506(2) (1979) (marital exemption under the rape statute is "inoperative as re-
spects spouses living apart whether under a decree of judicial separation or otherwise"); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1O(E) (Supp. 
1980); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). 
20. IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979) (spousal exception to rape doesn't apply if one 
spouse has begun legal proceedings for divorce or separation or the spouses have been 
living apart for at least 180 days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979) ("A 
person does not commit a crime under this chapter [defining the criminal charge of rape] 
if the victim is his legal spouse, unless the spouses are living apart or one of them has 
filed for separate maintenance or divorce."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1O(E) (Supp. 1980) 
(spouse means a legal husband or wife, unless the couple is living apart or either hus-
band or wife has filed for separate maintenance or divorce). 
21. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). 
22. ALASKA STAT. § 11-41-445(a)(2) (1978). 
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (1977) which states: "Persons living together 
in cohabitation are married for the purpose of this article, regardless of the legal status 
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Most of the statutes contain no legislative commentary elu-
cidating the policy behind the adoption of the exemption. One 
legislature briefly notes its reason for granting spousal immunity 
to rape charges: "At common law, a man could not legally rape 
his wife. Although that issue appears not to have been raised in 
any reported case it is expected that the common law rule would 
be applied in Maine."24 Another legislature mentions its appre-
hension over the possibility of false charges and the presumed 
consensual nature of marital sexual relations to explain its mari-
tal rape exemption.25 The little legislative commentary that 
exists suggests that the steadfast adherence of legislatures to the 
notion that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife finds 
explanation in the common law history of the exemption and in 
its legal rationales. 
At common law, a woman, including her sexuality, was con-
sidered the property of her husband, and the law did not recog-
nize any crime in a husband violating the woman who legally 
belonged to him.2S Somewhat less draconian legal explanations 
imply, in the marriage contract, a wife's irrevocable consent to 
sexual relations with her husband.2'1 The possibility of fabricated 
charges expresses a perennial concern in the legal treatment of 
rape.28 A state's interest in protecting the marital relationship 
from the destructive effect of a rape charge is another possible 
explanation for the exemption.29 The perceived difficulty of 
proving a marital rape charge might also influence a legislative 
of their relationship otherwise." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67(b) (West Supp. 1980); Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 
1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-5.506(2) (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (pur-
don Supp. 1980-1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(2) (1977). 
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251-1(A), Comment (West Pamph. 1980). 
25. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-5-506, Comment (West Pamph. 1977). This edition 
of the code provided that the exemption did not apply only if the couple is living apart 
under a decree of judicial separation. In a later edition, the legislature dropped the re-
quirement of a judicial decree and merely living apart now voids the exemption. MONT. 
REV. CODES ANN. § 45-5-506(2) (1979). 
26. For the historical origins of the marital rape exemption, see notes 45-65 infra 
and accompanying text. 
27. For a discussion of the contract theory, see notes 66-83 infra and accompanying 
text. 
28. The myth of faIse accusation is discussed further at notes 89-113 infra and ac-
companying text. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
722 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:717 
decision to adopt the exemption.30 
The policies reflected in the diversity of points at which the 
exemption no longer shields a husband from a rape charge are 
difficult to extrapolate. All the provisions require some outward 
manifestation that the marriage has broken down. Designating 
the actual or symbolic end of a marriage as the point at which 
the exemption no longer obtains, perhaps implies a legislative 
determination that whatever the reasons for the exemption, they 
are sufficiently attenuated when the marriage breaks down that 
the countervailing interest in protecting a woman from rape 
takes precedence. Why some states set this point at the time of 
final divorce and others when the couple chooses to live apart is 
unclear. 
Those statutes comprehending unmarried couples within 
the exemption complicate the policy considerations even further. 
Such a provision does not further any state interest in protect-
ing a marital relationship or come within the state's power to 
regulate marriage. Moreover, there is no marriage contract on 
which to base a theory of contractual consent to sexual relations. 
A few states have revised their rape statutes to provide for 
prosecution of marital rape charges. Delaware31 and Hawaii32 
have adopted rape statutes which provide that anyone who "by 
forcible compulsion"33 or "without . . . consent"" engages in 
. sexual intercourse with another is guilty of second degree rape. 
Neither statute includes, in these or any related sections, the 
typical limiting language that the victim not be the wife of the 
offender. Both states, however, limit prosecutions for first degree 
rape.35 Delaware does not provide for a first degree rape charge 
30. Proof problems are discussed at notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text. 
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1979) states: "A man is guilty of rape in the 
second degree when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female without 
her consent." 
32. HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-731 (Supp. 1980) provides: "A person commits the of-
fense of rape in the second degree if: (a) He intentionally engages in sexual intercourse 
by forcible compulsion with any person •... " 
33. [d.· 
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1979). 
35. The difference in classification as first degree or second degree relates to the 
difference in the length of sentence which may be imposed. For example, under the Ha-
waii code, the maximum sentence for first degree rape is 20 years and the maximum 
Women's Law Forum 
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if the victim was the defendant's voluntary social companion on 
the occasion of the crime and had previously permitted him sex-
ual contact unless the accused inflicted serious physical, mental 
or emotional injury upon the victim.86 The Hawaii statute also 
proscribes a first degree rape charge if the victim was the volun-
tary social companion of the accused and had engaged in con-
sensual sexual intercourse with the accused in the past year.81 
Under the Hawaii statute, even if a woman was the voluntary 
social companion of her attacker, first degree rape may be 
charged if the attacker inflicts "serious bodily injury"8S upon 
her. 
Three states allow a woman to charge her husband with first 
degree rape. Nebraska89 and Oregon40 provide for first degree 
rape charges without any statutory limitations based on the rela-
tionship of the victim and the accused. New Jersey has a provi-
sion stating that marriage is not a defense to a rape charge.41 
California has enacted a penal code section addressed spe-
cifically to spousal rape.42 The statute provides that spousal rape 
sentence for second degree rape is 10 years. HAw. REv. STAT. § 706-660 (1976). 
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1979). 
37. A person commits the offense of rape in the first degree if: (a) 
He intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse, by forcible 
compulsion, with another person and: (i) The other person is 
not, upon the occasion, his voluntary social companion who 
had within the previous twelve months permitted him sexual 
intercourse; or (ii) He recklessly inflicts serious bodily injury 
upon the other person • • • • 
HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 1980). 
38. [d. 
39. The Nebraska statute provides: "Actor shall mean a person accused of sexual 
assault •••• Victim shall mean the person alleging to have been sexually assaulted." 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318 (1979). That section provides for first degree sexual assault 
when any person subjects another to sexual penetration. 
40. Oregon's statute provides: "(1) A person who has sexual intercourse with a fe-
male commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (a) The female is subjected to 
forcible compulsion by the male •••• " OR. REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1979-1980). 
41. After providing for the definitions of rape in the various degrees, New Jersey 
provides: "No actor shall be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this 
chapter because of ••• marriage to the victim." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:14-5(b) (West 
Pamph. 1980). 
42. (a) Rape of a person who is the spouse of a perpetrator is an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished against the will of the 
spouse by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury •••• (b) [T]here shall be no arrest or prosecu-
tion under this section unless the violation of this section is 
7
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is a crime if: (1) one spouse forces sexual intercourse against the 
other spouse's will, or (2) the attacker spouse places the victim 
in "fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury."43 The victim 
spouse must report the rape within thirty days, a limitation 
which does not apply to other rape victims in California.44 
This overview of the statutory provisions has shown that 
the great "majority of states retain the marital rape exemption, 
and raises two basic questions: (1) What led to the notion that a 
husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife, and (2) Why has 
the law allowed the concern for protecting a woman from rape to 
be outweighed by other considerations in marital rape? These 
questions compel an inquiry into the origins of the exemption 
and the legal justifications for its continued application. 
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE MARITAL RAPE 
EXEMPTION 
The history of rape and marriage laws provides some insight 
into the genesis of the marital rape exemption. The matrix of 
much of the legal and social system in medieval England was the 
law of private property.41! The protection of property interests 
influenced both rape and marriage laws. History also reveals an 
intrinsic connection between the acts of rape and marriage. The 
marital rape exemption cari be linked to the interplay of these 
forces, which made a woman the property of her husband.46 
Some of the earliest rape laws developed in response to the 
practice of "marriage by capture," whereby a man abducted and 
reported to a peace officer having the power to arrest for a 
violation of this section or to the district attorney of the 
county in which the violation occurred within 30 days after 
the day of violation. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1981). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See generally 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d 
ed., reissued 1968). 
46. In an opinion repudiating the rationales and policies in favor of the marital rape 
exemption, one court noted that: "A close examination of the historical origins of this 
principle reveal that it is rooted in the ancient concepts of a wife as a chattel and the 
inviolability of the husband's supreme role in a marriage relationship." State v. Smith, 
148 N.J. Super. 219, 229, 372 A.2d 386, 391 (1977). The court ultimately upheld the 
exemption, reasoning that it was a legislative not a judicial function to determine the 
elements of a crime. 
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raped a woman, then married her.47 English law only proscribed 
abduction if the woman had goods or lands, or was an heiress.f8 
The attempt to secure property through a forcible marriage, not 
the abduction and rape of a woman, was the punishable of-
fense!9 The woman's guardian could bring an action for the 
trespass against his property interest in her marriage.IIO Under 
47. This practice can be traced to ancient germanic marriage laws. "It is said with 
some show of truth that in the earliest Teutonic laws we may see many traces of 'mar-
riage by capture.' The 'rape-marriage' ••• is a punishable offense; but it is still a mar-
riage, as we find it also in the Hindu law-books." 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra 
note 45, at 364. 
48. The first English statute proscribing this practice was enacted in 1487. It 
provided: 
Where Women, as well as Maidens, as Widows and Wives, 
having Substances, some in Goods moveable and some in 
Lands and Tenements, and some being Heirs apparent unto 
their ancestors, for the Lucre of such Substances, been often 
times taken by Misdoers, contrary to their Will, and after 
married to such Misdoers, or to other by their Assent, or 
defoiled. 
Quoted in 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 5504 (1966). 
The statute made such an abduction a felony. 1 L. RAoZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 436 (1948). When interpret-
ing the statute, the courts determined that "[t]he crucial circumstance on which the ap-
plication of the statute depended was that the woman carried away against her will had 
to have substance of goods or land, or be an heiress apparent." [d. at 440. 
49. This is clear from one leading case in which a court held that the forcible abduc-
tion and marriage of a twelve year old girl who did not have goods or land and was not 
an heiress, was not punishable under the statute. 1 L. RAoZINOWICZ, supra note 48, at 
44O-4l. "'Of forcible marriage, etc. it is observable • • • that by confining the offense to 
women of estate only, moral principles are made to yield to political considerations; and 
the security of property is deemed more essential than the preservation of female chasti-
ty ••• .''' [d. at 44l. 
50. The father or the woman's guardian had an interest in her marriage because a 
bridegroom was required to pay a father or the guardian for the marriage. "The usual 
and lawful marriage, however, is a 'sale-marriage'; in consideration of money paid down, 
the bride is handed over to the bridegroom." 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 
45, at 364. These same authors note the penalty for forcible marriage: "IT a man forcibly 
abducts a maiden, let him pay 50 shillings to him to whom she belongs. There was no 
talk of giving her back ..• ." [d. at 365 n.5. IT a woman was betrothed to a man and 
then abducted by another, the abductor was required to pay the man to whom she had 
been betrothed. "Where there had been a solemn betrothal it is likely that the bride-
groom thereby acquired some rights over the bride which were good against third per-
sons, and that any who carried her off would have to pay a b6t to him." [d. at 365-66. 
Another author describes the action for abduction thusly: "In the case of a daughter 
• • ., there was a medieval action of trespass for abduction; but it lay only if she were an 
heir presumptive, to protect the proprietary interest in her marriage." J. BAKER, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 382 (2d ed. 1979). 
Another commentator's description of the trespass action emphasizes that the crimi-
nal act was not against the woman, but her guardian. 
[I]f a layman is convicted of abducting and marrying off a 
9
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one statute, the woman was compelled to forfeit her property to 
her family during the marriage, to keep the property from pass-
ing to the abductor. iiI Despite these sanctions, the marriage was 
valid.1i2 
Although in the case of forcible marriage only the underly-
ing property offense was criminally recognized, rape was a statu-
tory felony. liS Under medieval rape statutes, however, a rapist 
could avoid punishment if the woman "by consent of the judge 
and her parents" married him.M Thus, if a woman did not, or 
was not forced to, marry her attacker after the rape, he was sub-
ject to severe criminal penalties.1i1i Marriage in either instance, 
however, exempted a man from criminal liability for rape. 
Marriage at common law, predicated on the premise that a 
woman was her husband's chattel, justified the notion that a 
husband could not be guilty of raping his wife. The civil law of 
marriage evolved in the middle ages to define what constituted a 
marriage in order to determine property rights of the couple and 
their children.1i6 What developed were laws that divested mar-
ried women of their legal rights, justified by the notion of the 
child without leave of the chief lord let him restore to the 
guardian the value of the marriage, and because of his delict 
[sic], let his body be delivered to prison by the bailiffs until he 
has made amends to the guardian for his wrongful act and sat-
isfied the King for his wrongful trespass. 
2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS & CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 264 (1968). 
51. An abduction statute passed in 1558 provided that if a man abducts a girl under 
sixteen and marries her "he shall be imprisoned five years, or fined at the discretion of 
the justices, and she shall forfeit all her lands to her next of kin during the life of her 
said husband." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 2415 (W. 
Jones ed. 1915). 
52. In noting that a woman could testify against her husband in a prosecution under 
an abduction statute, Blackstone stated: "It is held that a woman thus taken away and 
married may be sworn and give evidence against the offender, though he is her husband 
de facto." Id. 
53. For a discussion of the various medieval English rape statutes see 2 J. BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 624-26 (7th ed. 1882). 
54. In discussing the history of rape laws, Blackstone notes that under the earliest 
laws, "the woman (by consent of the judge and her parents) might redeem the offender 
from the execution of his sentence, by accepting him for her husband, if he also was 
willing to agree to the exchange, but not otherwise." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at 
2418. 
55. The punishment for rape included death, castration, and loss of eyes. Id. at 
2417. 
56. See generally 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 45, at 240-399. 
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unity of the parties.1I1 
According to the eminent Justice Blackstone, "by marriage, 
the husband and wife are one person in law . . . . The very be-
ing or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of 
the husband .... "IIB Under this doctrine, marriage not only 
eradicated the woman's legal identity, but continued and en-
larged the husband's, thus resulting in the domination of a hus-
band over his wife.1I9 
When she married, a woman surrendered her personal and 
real property to her husband.60 All her earnings belonged to her 
husband;61 she had no right to contract, except as the agent of 
57. Long before married women had any legal rights, a single woman had rights 
under the law: 
A woman of twenty-one becomes an independent human crea-
ture, capable of holding and administering property to any 
amount; or if she can earn money, she may appropriate her 
earnings freely to any purpose she thinks good. Her father has 
no power over her or her property. But if she unites herself to 
a man, the law immediately steps in, and she finds herself leg-
islated for and her condition of life suddenly and entirely 
changed. Whatever age she may be of, she is again considered 
an infant,-she is again under "reasonable restraint"-she 
loses her separate existence, and is merged in that of her 
husband. 
Chapman, A Brief Summary in Plain Language, of the Most Important Laws Concern-
ing Women; Together With A Few Observations Thereon, in ON THE PROPERTY OF MAR-
RIED WOMEN AND THE LAW OF DIVORCE 13 (M. Milnes ed. 1975). 
58. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at 625-26. 
59. One commentator describes the woman's status under the unity of the parties 
doctrine by analogy, saying: 
The next thing that I will show you is this particularitie of 
law; in this consolidation which we call wedlock is a locking 
together; it is true that man and wife are one person, but 
understand in what manner. When a small brooke or little 
river incorporateth with Rhodanus, Humber, or the Thames, 
the poore rivulet loseth her name; it is carried and recarried 
with the new associate; it bareth no sway, it possessetb noth-
ing during coverture. A woman as soone as she is married is 
called covert, in Latine nupta, that is vailed, as it were 
clouded and overshadowed she hath lost her streame. I may 
more truly farre away say to a married woman, her new selfe is 
her superior, her companion, her master. 
Chapman, supra note 57, at 14. 
60. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 45, at 403-04. 
61. Chapman, supra note 57, at 7. 
11
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her husband;82 nor could she initiate a legal action in her own 
name.8S Not only did her property and legal rights belong to her 
husband, but her body was his as well.84 Thus, as one commen-
tator noted, "a husband forcing sex on his wife was merely mak-
ing use of his own property."811 
III. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MARITAL RAPE 
EXEMPTION 
A. THE CONTRACT THEORY 
Hale's statement that the marriage contract includes. the 
wife's irrevocable consent to sexual relations with her husband is 
the fulcrum upon which the modern legal justifications for the 
marital rape exemption turns.88 Because sexual intercourse is an 
integral part of marriage, the wife's consent inheres in the mar-
riage contract.8'1 Her consent need not be obtained for each act 
of intercourse because she is deemed to have consented to all 
acts of marital sexual intercourse at the time of marriage.88 
Thus, if a husband forces sexual intercourse on his wife, he is 
merely exercising his marital right.69 The consent given is irrevo-
cable; as part of the contract it lasts throughout the marriage. '10 
But although the rights and duties which come with mar-
62. 2 F .. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 45, at 405. 
63. Chapman, supra note 57, at 8. 
64. "A woman's body belongs to her husband; she is in his custody, and he can 
enforce his right by a writ of habeas corpus." ld. at 6. 
65. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 306, 309 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Marital Rape Exemption]. 
66. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
67. In discussing the marital rape exemption, one court noted: "Sexual intercourse 
between husband and wife is recognized as one of the chief aims and controlling objects 
of marriage . . . . It is asserted that a husband may enforce sexual connection, and that 
in the exercise of his marital right he cannot be guilty of the offense of rape." Anony-
mous, 206 Ala. 295, 297, 89 So. 462, 463 (1921) (quoting 13 R.C.L. 987, 988 § 6). Since 
sexual intercourse is one of the main objects of marriage, and the husband acquires a 
"marital right" to sexual intercourse, the woman's consent must be part of the marriage 
contract. 
68. Note, Criminal Law-Rape-Husband Cannot Be Guilty of Raping His Wife, 
State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977), 82 DICK. L. REv. 608, 610 
(1978). 
69. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
70. At the time Hale formulated his theory, a marriage could only be dissolved by 
death. The woman was not released from the marriage contract until her husband died, 
and thus, in effect this consent was irrevocable. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 225, 
372 A.2d 386, 388 (1977). 
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riage are generally described as contractual in nature, marriage 
resembles no other type of contract. Marriage is, in fact, more 
like a status.71 The parties enter into the "contract" without the 
benefit of traditional contract attributes and protections.72 The 
contract theory of marriage diverges from contract law not only 
in formation, but also in the way it is enforced. Generally, pri-
vate parties are not permitted under contract law to resort to 
self help to remedy a contract breach; and normally, contracts 
are enforceable only through the courts.7S Thus, applying a con-
tract theory, if a woman breaches the marital contract by with-
holding her consent to sexual relations, a husband should not be 
able to enforce the contract by rape. Furthermore, the remedy 
for breach of contract for personal services is not specific per-
formance.74 Contract law recognizes that personal services are 
unique and does not require a person to perform against his or 
her will.715 Therefore, to justify the marital rape exemption be-
cause of the marriage "contract" misconceives the nature of con-
tract law, the marital status, and the act of rape.76 
71. Marriage is a status because the law imposes the legal rights and duties on the 
parties; the parties do not bargain over and set the terms of their "contract." One com-
mentator makes this point by noting that: 
[c]ourts and commentators define and discuss marriage as a 
contract. Thus, one might expect that the terms of the rela-
tionship would be the subject of bargaining and agreement be-
tween the parties, and enforcement through the courts. But, in 
fact, parties to a marriage are not allowed to define their legal 
relationships, and if they attempt to do so, their agreements 
will not be enforced. A marriage "contract" thus exists only in 
the narrow sense that the parties decide whether to marry. 
Once they are married, the law dictates their roles; in mar-
rying, they enter a predetermined civil status. 
B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 561 
(1975). 
72. For example, the parties do not bargain over the terms of the contract, rather 
the law imposes the terms on the parties; such terms often escape the attention of the 
parties; no options are available, and the penalties are not apparent. Wertman, Legal 
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1170 (1974). 
Furthermore, this "contract" has traditionally been one-sided: The woman was com-
pelled to forfeit her property rights and her body to her husband. See notes 46-64 supra 
and accompanying text. 
73. See Comment, The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Exemption For 
Forcible Rape, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 181, 184 (1979). 
74.ld. 
75. ld. at 184 n.33. 
76. In State v. Smith, the court specifically rejected the application of contract law 
to marital rape because: 
[s]uch a mechanical application of principles of contract law 
are illogically applied in the area of forcible sexual invasions 
13
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B. THE CONSENT THEORY" 
The idea that, upon marrying, a woman gives irrevocable 
consent to the actions of her husband cannot withstand analysis, 
whether examined within the contract theory or analyzed on" its 
own. The theory of marital consent'1'1 in rape law is inconsistent 
with the notion of consent as interpreted and applied in other 
areas of law. Usually, the law does not permit a person to con-
sent to serious bodily injury inflicted by another.'18 Although the 
law will imply consent to injuries arising out of a situation in-
volving a potential for harm, if that situation is voluntarily en-
tered, the law does not imply consent to the malicious infliction 
of serious injury.'19 A woman may consent to sexual intercourse 
with her husband when it is a mutually desired act, but rape is 
the violent "desecration of the victim's person,"80 and to impute 
consent on the part of the victim exceeds the bounds of the law 
of consent. 
In domestic relations, the law recognizes many instances 
when a woman may withhold consent to sexual relations with 
her husband.81 Thus, outside of the context of rape, the law does 
... [because) [s)uch reasoning overlooks the basic nature of 
rape interdiction created by a civilized society. Rape is essen-
tially a crime of moral effrontery. The affront is to society in 
the larger sense as with all crimes, but to a rape victim its 
personal impact is unique. Given monogomy as a recognized 
societal goal, such reasoning can result in a kind of bondage of 
a wife, who alone becomes vulnerable as a result thereof. 
148 N.J. Super. at 227, 372 A.2d at 390. 
77. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text. 
78. The state's interest in protecting persons from harm and protecting the general 
"social well-being overrides respect for individual free will in crimes where grievous bod-
ily harm is inflicted by one person on another." Comment, Towards a Consent Standard 
in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 635 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Towards a 
Consent Standard). 
79. This is the case for activities such as sports where one generally is presumed to 
have consented to any injuries suffered, except where there was an intentional infliction 
of harm. ld. at 640. 
80. "[F)orcible rape ranks among the most serious crimes ••• because it amounts to 
a desecration of the victim's person which is a vital part of her sanctity and dignity as a 
human being." Newsom v. State, 533 P.2d 904, 911 (Alaska S. Ct. 1975). 
81. A woman may withhold consent when her husband is diseased and intercourse 
would impair her health or when she does not wish to condone adultery. For a discussion 
of these cases, see Legal Sanction of Spousal Abuse, supra note 10, at 568. Excessive sex 
is recognized as grounds for a divorce based on cruelty; and divorces have been denied on 
the ground that a wife withheld consent to sex. For a discussion of these cases see Mari-
tal Rape Exemption, supra note 65, at 312. Two recent cases recognized that a woman 
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not employ the mythical "wife's consent" to unconditionally en-
title a husband to sexual relations with his wife. Moreover, 
under certain circumstances a husband may be charged with 
raping his wife. Some statutes provide that after separation, a 
husband who forcibly sexually assaults his wife may be charged 
with rape.82 Additionally, the marital rape exemption does not 
immunize a husband from a rape charge when he aids and abets 
another in raping his wife.8s In recognizing that a woman may 
withhold her consent from her husband's sexual demands, the 
courts have undercut the basic premise of the marital rape 
exemption. • 
C. PROOF PROBLEMS IN SHOWING LACK OF CONSENT 
The issue of consent generates other obstacles. One com-
mentator has suggested that the difficulties of proving that a 
rape has occurred "reach their zenith when a wife accuses her 
husband of rape."84 The main problem is the difficulty of prov-
ing the wife's lack of consent to sexual relations on a particular 
occasion.85 But while the task of proving lack of consent between 
spouses might present a dilemma, perhaps the most arduous 
challenge lies in overcoming the jury's predisposition to doubt a 
has the right to refuse sexual contact with her husband. In one case, the husband was 
convicted for forcing his wife to perform fellatio on him. In the other case, a woman 
charged with murdering her husband pleaded self-defense from a sexual attack and the 
judge instructed the jury that a "woman is not compelled by law to submit against her 
will to sexual contact which she finds offensive." See id. at 321. 
82. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., Elliot v. State, 190 Ga. 803, 10 S.E.2d 843 (1940) (husband convicted of 
aiding and abetting in rape of his wife when he forced her to have sex with two men he 
hired to work for him); State v. Martin, 17 N.C. App. 317,194 S.E.2d 60 (1973) (although 
a husband is legally incapable of raping his wife, he may be convicted of rape when he 
aids and abets another who rapes his wife); State v. Blackwell, 241 Or. 528,407 P.2d 617 
(1965) (conviction of rape upheld for man charged with forcing his wife to submit to sex 
with another man). 0 
84. Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 
724 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife]. 
85. One commentator notes that: 
Since marriage is by definition a relationship in which both 
parties have presumably consented to sexual intercourse on a 
number of occasions, it becomes extremely difficult for a wife 
to prove that on certain occasions sex was different; she must 
have evidence that she did not consent, that she was forced 
against her will. 
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marital rape charge, and not in the unavailability Qf evidence.86 
Lack of consent could be shown by corroborating evidence, such 
as signs of physical force, and medical and witness testimony.87 
Prosecutions of alleged rapes where the victim previously con-
sented to sexual relations present similar proof problems, yet 
they are not barred.88 The difficulty of proof argument lacks 
force when balanced against the severity of the crime. The pub-
lic policy of protecting the victims of violent crimes should out-
weigh the argument that marital rape is too difficult to prove. 
D. FEAR OF FALSE ACCUSATIONS 
The Myth 
The fear that a vindictive wife will falsely accuse her hus-
band of rape is a fourth major justification for the marital rape 
exemption.89 Matthew Hale's early observation that rape is "an 
accusation easy to be made and hard to be proved and harder to 
be defended"90 shaped the legal definition of rape and the type 
of proof required.91 The conviction that women are extremely 
likely to fabricate charges of rape has been characterized by 
male commentators,92 judges,93 and psychiatrists94 as the fore-
86. One commentator suggests that the predisposition of juries to doubt a woman 
charging her husband with rape is a more difficult obstacle than proving nonconsent. Id. 
at 57. See notes 114-140 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty of 
obtaining a rape conviction. 
87. Evidence in rape cases does not rest solely on the woman's testimony and prose-
cutors are unlikely to bring a rape charge without sufficient substantiating evidence. See 
Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 
1382 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Corroboration Requirement]. 
88. Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 65, at 314. 
89. This fear was the major concern of opponents of the recent California legislation 
establishing marital rape as a criminal offense. Griffin, supra note 85, at 57. 
90. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1860). This statement has traditionally 
been a mandatory jury instruction in rape cases. Towards a Consent Standard, supra 
note 78, at 617. In People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247,123 Cal. Rptr. 
119 (1975), the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved use of this instruction in 
rape cases. 
91. The fear of false accusations has resulted in: the corroboration requirement, see 
generally The Corroboration Requirement, supra note 87, at 1373; the resistance re-
quirement, Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 681, 
684-85 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Resistance Standard]; requiring evidence of the 
victim's chastity, 3A WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 924a at 736 (rev. ed. Chadbourn 1970); Pack-
ineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 685-86 (1953); and cautionary jury instructions; 
People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975). 
92. Surely the simplest, and perhaps the most important, reason 
not to permit conviction for rape on the uncorroborated word 
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most concern in rape law. 
The sexual nature of rape generates attitudes which distin-
guish this crime from all others. Two issues lie behind the fear 
of false accusations: the difficulty of determining consent, and a 
perception of women as sexually psychopathic. At one end of the 
consent continuum is the "classic" rape: "a sudden sexual de-
mand on a dark and isolated street by one or more unknown 
of the prosecutrix is that the word is very often false. False 
accusations of sex crimes in general, and rape in particular, 
are generally believed to be much more frequent than untrue 
charges of other crimes. 
Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as Corroborating Charges of Rape]. "In its very nature rape is a crime which is 
peculiarly open to false accusations .••• " Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 ILL. L. 
REV. 410, 421 (1925). 
93. "There is no class of prosecutions attended with so much danger, or which af-
ford so ample an opportunity for the free play of malice and private vengeance." People 
v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856). 
94. The most dangerous witnesses in prosecutions for morality 
offenses are the youthful ones (often mere children) in whom 
the sex-instinct holds the foremost place in their thoughts and 
feelings . • . . But on the other hand one must not be 
deceived by a madonna-like countenance that such a girl can 
readily assume; nor by the convincing upturn of the eyes, with 
which she seeks to strengthen her credibility . . . . With pro-
fuse falsities they shamelessly speak of the coarsest sex mat-
ters . . .: It is just such witnesses that often bring into their 
picture individuals who have never even been near them and 
that throw suspicion recklessly on the most worthy persons 
.... In male youths, this peculiar sex-disposition plays a far 
smaller part. 
Monkemoller, Psychology and Psychopathology of Testimony, in 4 BmLIOTHEK DER 
KRIMINALISTIK, pt. 2, § a6, at 333 (1930), quoted in 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 743-
44. 
Every girl who enters a plausible but unproved story of rape 
should be required to have a psychiatric examination . • • • 
The reason I think that rape in particular belongs in this cate-
gory [requiring psychiatric examination] is one well known to 
psychologists, namely that fantasies of being raped are exceed-
ingly common in women, indeed one may almost say that they 
are universal. 
Letter of Dr. Karl Menninger (Sept. 5, 1933), quoted in id. 
Accusations of rape, unless there is perfectly clear evidence of 
an assault, are open to suspicion • • • • One has, therefore, to 
weigh all the possibilities of a case with great care to realize 
that such accusations frequently have no foundation whatever 
in fact and originate entirely in the mind of the accuser. 
Letter of Dr. William White (Sept. 7, 1933), quoted in id. 
17
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men, perhaps intoxicated and armed."915 In this s~tuation, the 
woman's lack of consent is presumed. In the middle of the con-
tinuum is the situation in which the complainant and the ac-
cused are acquainted and the "encounter occurred in an apart-
ment to which they both went willingly. "96 Here, lack of consent 
is not so readily presumed and the woman's version may often 
be doubted. At the far end of the continuum lies marital rape, in 
which the entire relationship with the accused is presumed con-
sensual. In traditional rape law theory, deviation from this con-
struct may be analyzed as an expression of psychological conflict 
or abnormality.97 
Various theories of female sexuality have been advanced to 
justify regarding with suspicion a woman's claim that she did 
not consent to intercourse. Women are seen, for example, as 
needing to attain sexual gratification through struggle and resis-
tance,96 thereby creating evidence with which to convict an inno-
cent man.99 Not only the masochistic woman, but the ambiva-
lent one as well, renders the issue of consent unreliable through 
95. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and 
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 66 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 
Operation of the Consent Standard]. This classic image of rape does not conform to 
reality. Many rapists know their victims and plan their rapes. M. AMm, PATTERNS IN 
FORCIBLE RAPE 143, 234-35 (1971). 
96. Operation of the Consent Standard, supra note 95, at 66. 
97. Dean Wigmore relies extensively on psychiatric case studies and comments re-
garding women's psychosis, ostensibly resulting in uncontrollable propensity to falsify 
charges of sexual abuse, to justify the admission into evidence of a rape complainant's 
chastity. "No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female 
complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by 
a qualified physician." 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 737. Another commentator draws 
heavily on Freudian theories of female sexuality to support his view that the consent 
standard in rape based on a woman's idea of when she did or did not consent is "an 
uncertain standard for branding sexual intercourse a crime as serious as forcible rape." 
Operation of the Consent Standard, supra note 95, at 56. One commentator arguing for 
the resistance standard in rape to remove conjecture, uncertainty, and the woman's often 
distorted opinion from the law of forcible rape relies on "current psychological evidence 
indicat[ing] the unreliability of a woman's report of the incident, [so that] nothing 
should be left to the conceivably unreasonable opinion of the alleged victim." The Resis-
tance Standard, supra note 91, at 683. 
98. "'Although a woman may desire sexual intercourse, it is customary for her to 
say 'no, no, no' (although meaning 'yes, yes, yes') and to expect the male to be the ag-
gressor . . . . It is always difficult in rape cases to determine whether the female really 
meant 'no' .... '" The Resistance Standard, supra note 91, at 682 (quoting Slovenko, 
A Panoramic Overview: Sexual Behavior and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE 
LAW 5, 51 (Slovenko ed. 1965». 
99. Operation of the Consent Standard, supra note 95, at 66. 
Women's Law Forum 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/1
1981] MARITAL RAPE 735 
her alternating resistance and acceptance of the man's sexual 
demands. 100 In both situations, the act of forcible sexual inter-
course is perceived as not necessarily contrary to the true wishes 
of the woman.10l Furthermore, in these circumstances the wo-
man is often seen as lacking the ability to accurately distinguish 
the dominant attitude of consent or nonconsent.102 It is hypothe-
sized that a woman recalls rape to alleviate feelings of guilt that 
would arise from a sense of willing participation. lOS 
Once the fear of false accusations is accepted as well sup-
ported by this kind of perception of women's sexual nature, 
other more tenuous justifications for the fear may be accepted as 
well. Thus, for example, psychological disorders actually suffered 
by some women may be generalized to every woman who charges 
a man with rape. The fact that psychiatrists have confirmed that 
some women imagine that they have been victims of sexual at-
tack, though none has occurred, has led some commentators to 
conclude that false accusations arise from a woman's unchastity 
or from rape fantasies. 1M A married woman accusing her hus-
band of rape, on the other hand, may be seen as motivated by a 
desire to blackmail him into a profitable property settlement,105 
a desire for revenge/os or hatred.l07 
100. Id. at 67. 
101. Id. at 66-68. 
102. Id. at 65-70. 
103. "Most women probably have a strong need to adopt the socially acceptable 
motive and thus some may honestly believe that they were forced to submit over their 
mental opposition." Id. at 68. "A woman may accuse an innocent man of raping her 
because. • • having consented to intercourse, she is ashamed of herself and bitter at her 
partner . • . ." Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 92, at 1138. 
104. "The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in 
the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which she is the heroine or victim. 3A WIG-
MORE, supra note 91, at 736. "The feminine wish to be subjected to a sexual attack may 
become the subject of an hallucination." Operation of the Consent Standard, supra note 
95, at 69 n.102. 
[F]antasies of being raped are exceedingly common in women, 
indeed one may almost say that they are universal . . . . Of 
course, the normal woman who has such a fantasy does not 
confuse it with reality, but it is so easy for some neurotic 
individuals to translate their fantasies into actual beliefs and 
memory falsifications • • • • 
Statement of Dr. Karl Menninger, quoted in 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 744. 
105. Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, supra note 84, at 725. 
106. Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 65, at 314. 
107. The mysteries of sexual relationships have impressed many 
experienced judges as well as psychologists. Where there has 
19
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Men fear rape charges not only because they believe women 
are inclined to fabricate complaints, but also because they be-
lieve that the emotion raised by a rape charge causes juries to be 
sympathetic to the woman at the expense of the man. lOS Women 
who contrive false charges are believed to be quite convincing 
when spinning their tales so that others are easily persuaded of 
the truth of the accusation.lo9 Rape usually occurs when no one 
other than the victim and the attacker are present.l1O Evidence 
of physical force is often unavailable in rape cases.1l1 A combi-
nation of a convincing liar and an awareness that rape is often 
accomplished with little corroborating evidence is thought to in-
crease the ease with which women will undertake to falsify a 
once been love, there is reason to suspect that it will be re-
placed by hatred rather than indifference. A wife who is will-
ing to prod the state into beginning a felony prosecution 
against her husband is unlikely to recollect objectively. 
Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, supra note 84, at 724-25. 
108. "The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the 
respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give 
easy credit to ••. a plausible tale." 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 736. "[S]uch charges 
(rape) are extremely likely to succeed because of the intense feelings that the charge is 
very likely to awaken." Puttkanlmer, supra note 92, at 422. "The ordinary reaction to an 
accusation of a sex offense usually committed in secret is that the offense has been com-
mitted .•.• " People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885, 892, 129 P.2d 367, 370 (1942). Rape 
"must be conceded [to be] ••. the kind of act [which] •.. is so thoroughly repugnant to 
the average person that it can breed that righteous outrage which is the enemy of objec-
tive fact finding." People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 395, 426 P.2d 161, 164, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. I, 4 (1967). 
109. In describing the case of a girl who allegedly falsely accused members of her 
family of sexual abuse, one psychiatrist reported: 
She was possessed of a very dramatic manner • • • . As she 
made [the accusations] ... she looked the interviewer right in 
the eyes; there was not a hint of evasiveness • . • • Her story 
was told in such detail, was so well remembered from time to 
time, and she presented such an outward form of sincerity 
that experienced people were led to believe there must be 
much in what she said. 
Healy & Healy, Pathological Lying, Accusation, and Swindling, in 4 CASES OF PATHO-
LOGICAL ACCUSATION 172 (1915) quoted in 3A WIGMORE, supra note 94, at 741. 
110. "Rape seldom if ever takes place in broad daylight, in public places, or in plain 
view of numerous spectators and potential witnesses. Instead, the assailant usually man-
ages to lure or force his victim into some obscure place so that he will not be seen or 
interrupted." Note, Repeal of the Corroboration Requirement: Will It Tip the Scales of 
Justice?, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 669, 670 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Repeal of the Corrobora-
tion Requirement]. For statistics on the time and place of rape see M. McDERMOTI', 
RAPE VICTIMIZATION IN TWENTY-SIX AMERICAN CITIES 17-18 (1979). 
111. Id. A woman might fear for her life and thus avoid resistance. Berger, Man's 
Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. I, 11 
(1977). 
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rape charge for either sick, confused, or malevolent motives.112 A 
rape charge, once made, is thought to evoke in judges and juries 
such animosity for the accused and such compassion for the vic-
tim that unsound convictions will abound, lIS thus substantiating 
men's fears and the need for extreme caution in taking a wo-
man's charge of rape at face value. 
Rebutting The Myth 
1. Rape is an underreported crime. 
Recent studies have shown that many traditional notions 
regarding rape are less universally true than previously believed. 
The assumed frequency of false charges is one notion which has 
been seriously questioned by a number of studies and commen-
tators. Rape is an immensely underreported crime.114 Many rea-
sons for this phenomenon have come to light as victims of rape 
and their treatment by the criminal justice system have received 
attention.ll11 Because rape is often a personally humiliating expe-
rience for the woman, and because of the social stigma often im-
puted to rape victims,116 reporting the incident may exact too 
high a price from the woman. Rape charges often expose women 
to insensitive treatment by police during the investigation,1l7 
112. Repeal of the Corroboration Requirement, supra note 110, at 671. 
113. "Judging merely from the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one must 
infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity could 
not be exposed." 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 736. "When a charge of" [rape] •.• is 
made, the people, and the jurors likewise are apt to let their indignation get the better of 
their judgment, and convict upon evidence which does not authorize it." Davis v. State, 
102 Ga. 433, 437, 48 S.E. 180, 182 (1904). 
114. One report estimates that unreported rapes exceed reported rapes by more 
than three and a half times. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 21 (1967). An-
other report estimates that between 1973 and 1977 the percent of unreported rapes 
ranged between 51 and 42 percent. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT As-
SISTANCE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SER-
VICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTIC.E STATISTICS 1979, at 329 (1979). 
115. Se~ Berger, supra note 111, at 2-7, for a discussion of the various forces behind 
and ways in which, recent public attention has begun to focus on rape. 
116. The Corroboration Requirement, supra note 87, at 1374. 
117. See [d. at 1374 n.62, in which women describe police reaction as: "Disbelief. 
Ridicule. Questioning along voyeuristic lines. Or just plain lack of interest." See also 
Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 
347-49 (1973), and S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL, 408-12 (1975) in which she re-
counts her experience of speaking to a group of police about rape "and was met with a 
chortle of hoots and laughter from the ..• men. 'Honey, you don't believe there is such 
a thing as rape, do you?' [she replied] 'Don't you?' 'Noooo' came the nearly unanimous 
response." [d. at 409. 
21
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and by the defense attorney at trial. us In addition, a lack of cor-
roborating evidence appears to deter more founded complaints 
than it does to encourage false ones.us Similarly, the low convic-
tion rate in all rape cases, and especially in nonaggravated 
cases,120 likewise discourages rape complaints. Given the fact 
that many rapists are acquainted with their victims,121 the fear 
of retaliation by the attacker also arises.u2 
A woman raped by her husband would be dissuaded from 
filing charges by these same personal, societal, and legal impedi-
ments. One author suggests that these restraints are magnified 
in the case of marital rape.l2S Marital rape is often part of the 
syndrome of domestic violence,124 another largely unreported 
crime.125 Justifying the marital rape exemption on the basis of 
false charges by vindictive wives simply fails to consider these 
significant and effective deterrents to filing a complaint. 
2. Police disbelief 
Charges of rape are not readily believed. Initially, the police 
categorize many complaints as unfounded.128 Once investigation 
begins, the number of complaints so categorized increases. The 
police are very likely to term complaints unfounded where the 
victim and attacker were acquainted.12'1 "Victim-precipitated" 
118. See Berger, supra note 111, at 13, for an example of cross-examination at trial. 
119. The Corroboration Requirement, supra note 87, at 1382. One 'study revealed 
that "[t]he second most frequently given reason for not reporting completed rape was 
that the victim felt nothing could be done, there was a lack of proof." M. McDERMOTI', 
supra note 110, at 46. 
120. The Corroboration Requirement, supra note 87, at 1379. In nonaggravated 
rapes, that is, those cases where there is no evidence of extrinsic violence, it is less likely 
that proof will be available, resulting in a greater likelihood that the victim will not 
report the crime. See generally M. McDERMOTI', supra note 111, at 46. 
121. M. AMm, supra note 95, at 234-35. 
122. The Corroboration Requirement, supra note 87, at 1374. 
123. Griffin, supra note 85, at 57. 
124. [d. at 58; see generally L. WALKER, THE BATI'ERED WOMAN, 105-26 (1979). 
125. L. WALKER, supra note 124, at 19. 
126. FBI statistics have pegged this figure of initial "unfounded" complaints at 
about 18%. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 14 (1971). "Un-
founded" means "only that police, for various reasons, have decided not to advise prose-
cution. It does not imply that the woman's report of the rape is inaccurate." Comment, 
Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919, 928 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Sexism in Society]. See also the discussion, supra note 117, illumi-
nating some of the police prejudice, which results in the unfounding of rape complaints. 
127. According to one study, where the victim and accused are acquainted or dating, 
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rapes, those "where the victim either retracts from an initial 
agreement to have sexual relations or enters into a 'vulnerable' 
situation, "12S are also largely dismissed as unfounded.129 Because 
a marital rape involves a married couple, with the implied agree-
ment to engage in sexual relations based on the consent-contract 
theory/So the factors which the police use to dismiss a complaint 
as unfounded are emphasized. lSI Regardless of the truth of the 
charge, most marital rape complaints will not survive police in-
vestigation. The fear of false accusations is unwarranted given 
the police disbelief that accompanies the filing of a charge of 
rape. 
3. Jury verdicts 
Even those charges of rape which survive these obstacles 
and' come to trial contradict the myth of great victim sympathy 
and defendant opprobrium.ls2 Nationally, more than half of 
those apprehended and prosecuted for rape are acquitted. ISS In 
individual cities, the percentage of convictions drops even 
lower.lM One famous study of forty-three jury verdicts docu-
mented that, in cases lacking evidence of physical violence, the 
defendant was acquitted in thirty-nine cases.lSG In cases involv-
ing violence, where the victim and defendant previously engaged 
in consensual sexual relations, the jury would also acquit the de-
fendant.lss Indeed, verdicts in rape cases were found to be 
greatly influenced by the moral judgment the jury attached to 
the victims' behavior and character.ls7 Juries, "often harshly, 
43 % of all complaints are rejected as unfounded; in cases in which the victim and ac-
cused are strangers, only 18% are unfounded. Note, Police Discretion and the Judge-
ment That a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape In Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
277, 291 (1968). 
128. Sexism in Society, supra note 126, at 929. 
129. Id. 
130. For a discussion of the consent-contract theory, see notes 66-83 supra and 
accompanying text. 
131. Other factors which also contribute to a finding of an unfounded complaint are 
victim intoxication, delay in reporting, good physical condition of the victim, and the 
absence of a medical examination or evidence of a battery. Sexism in Society, supra note 
126, at 928-29. 
132. See notes 108-113 supra and accompanying text discussing this problem. 
133. For a discussion of these statistics see People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 
879, 538 P.2d 247, 257-58, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 129-30 (1975). 
134. Id. 
135. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 252-54 (1966). 
136. Id. at 251. 
137. The authors note a case of brutal rape in which the jury voted for acquittal. 
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scrutinize the female complainant" and show lenience for the 
defendant. ISS The study found acquittal particularly likely when 
the jury felt the woman in some way contributed to the at-
tack.ls9 Thus, the fear that juries will convict innocent men out 
of sympathy for the victim is not supported by the evidence. 
4. Corroborating evidence 
Corroborating evidence is necessary to bring a rape charge 
to trial. Without such evidence, police treat the complaint as un-
founded, and juries are unlikely to convict. Prosecutors rarely, if 
ever, rely solely on the testimony of the victim.14o The difficulty 
of pro~ng a rape case seems to outweigh the difficulty of de-
fending one. Thus a marital rape complaint without corroborat-
ing evidence is unlikely to survive the criminal justice system 
because the system is designed to eliminate unwarranted 
complaints. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF MARITAL RAPE 
The preceding discussion of the marital rape exemption, its 
origins, the legal justifications and their limitations, and its con-
tinued existence in the laws of most states, underscores the need 
to develop legal challenges to the exemption. Many of the laws 
governing marriage no longer restrict a married woman~s legal 
rights by placing her under the control of her husband. HI Cur-
rent policy behind rape laws reflects a concern for the harm 
done to "the person and feelings of the victim of rape."142 In 
short, legal and social mores no longer tolerate the notion of a 
woman as the property of her husband. One challenge to the 
marital rape exemption is through the existence of a violation of 
The victim had several illegitimate children and had been previously accused of prosti-
tution. [d. 
138. [d. at 249. 
139. [d. The jury viewed any voluntary interaction with the defendant as contribut-
ing to the attack. [d. at 249-51.. 
140. In none of the cases studied did the prosecution rely solely on the victim's 
testimony. [d. at 141-42. 
141. For a discussion of a wife's status as chattel, see notes 56-65 supra and accom-
panying text. See generally Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 65, at 310-11, which 
reviews the changes in the legal status of married women. 
142. "The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of 
the victim of the rape." CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West Supp. 1981). 
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the woman's constitutional right of privacy. Us The remainder of 
this Comment will address the right of privacy and its applica-
tion to the marital rape exemption. 
A. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
In Griswold v. Connecticut,144 the Supreme Court held that 
a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of contraceptives vio-
lated a married couple's right of privacy.145 In an opinion by 
Justice Douglas, the Court found the constitutional right of pri-
vacy implicit in the penumbras of the guarantees in the first, 
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.146 Griswold deter-
mined that the right of privacy encompasses the marital rela-
tionship and that the Connecticut statute impermissibly trans-
gressed on the intimacies of that relationship.u7 Since Griswold, 
the Court has struggled to define the substance and perimeters 
of the constitutional right of privacy. 
Shifting from Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold, the 
Court in Roe v. Wade148 explicitly grounded the right of privacy 
in "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of person~ liberty 
and restrictions upon state action .... "149 In defining those in-
terests protected by the right of privacy, the Court stated that 
they must be "rights which can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty. . . .' "150 In an effort to 
illuminate the meaning of these notions, the Court listed mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relations, and child 
143. An equal protection argument can also be made on grounds that the exemption 
denies married women rights accorded to single women. This argument is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. See generally Comment, Rape Laws, Equal Protection, and Pri-
vacy Rights, 54 TuL. L. REv. 456, 475-76 (1980). 
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). . 
145. The statute subjected those who used contraceptives to fine and imprisonment. 
The defendants at the criminal trial were the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood 
League of Connecticut and physicians who prescribed contraceptives for married women 
and were prosecuted as accessories. 381 U.S. at 480. 
146. Id. at 484. The concurring opinions of Justices Goldberg and Harlan drew on 
the concept of liberty which protects fundamental rights to create the right of privacy 
rather than relying on the Bill of Rights for justification. Id. at 486-87. 
147. Id. at 485-86. 
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
149. Id. at 153. In adopting this position, the Court agreed with Justice Goldberg'S 
concurrence in Griswold: "1 do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal 
rights that are fundamental and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of 
Rights." 381 U.S. at 486. 
150. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152. 
25
Pracher: Marital Rape
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
742 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:717 
rearing and education as examples of realms within which one 
may maintain some expectation of privacy free from undue gov-
ernmental interference.1G1 Although Griswold spoke of the right 
of privacy within a marital relationship, the Court has subse-
quently made clear that the right of privacy is an individual's 
right, independent of any marital relationship.1G2 Re-examining 
Griswold in Carey v. Population Services International, us the 
Court stated that the interest protected by the right of privacy 
was not "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,"U3.1 but 
rather the individual's interest in making certain important de-
cisions.1M Thus, although the right of privacy remains somewhat 
of an enigma, it is clear from the Court's decisions that the right 
protects an individual's interest in making autonomous decisions 
on fundamental issues, unfettered by undue governmental 
interference. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARITAL RAPE AND RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY MATTERS FUNDAMENTAL TO PERSONAL LIFE 
The problem of discerning what issues fundamentally affect 
a person's life, and thus implicate the right of privacy, to some 
extent can be resolved by identifying the underlying concerns 
inherent in the family, procreation, and marriage areas which 
the Court has included within the protective reach of that right. 
The concerns that emerge will be examined in relation to how 
the marital rape exemption interferes with these aspects of a 
151. Id. at 152-53. 
152. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Relying mainly on an equal protection 
analysis, the Court held unconstitutional a law prohibiting unmarried couples from ob-
taining contraceptives. In considering the right to privacy the Court stated: "If the right 
to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." ld. at 453. 
153. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (prohibition of sale and distribution of contraceptives to 
minors held unconstitutional). 
153.1. ld. at 687 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86). 
154. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), expressly stated that the right of pri-
vacy protected the decision whether to have a child. Similarly, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), held that the right of privacy protected a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy. In Walen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court stated: "The cases sometimes 
characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of 
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 
ld. at 598-600. When referring to the right of privacy, this Comment focuses on the 
second interest. 
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woman's life and, consequently, her right of privacy. 
Although the Court does not speak in philosophical terms 
when invoking the right of privacy,ll1l1 it has implicitly incorpo-
rated some basic philosophical components of the concept of pri-
vacy through the types of interests considered fundamental. One 
formulation of privacy incorporates three basic elements: con-
trol, identity, and intimacy.1116 These components, understood in 
relation to one another, provide that a definition of privacy 
involves "control over the intimacies of [one's] personal iden-
tity."1I1'l In this way, privacy protects the essential aspects of our 
selfhood.1l1s 
Control 
Control is an important aspect of the notion of privacy. The 
ability to decide for one's self to refrain from or to participate in 
certain life experiences inheres in the concept of ourselves as 
persons. This notion of control encompasses those decisions 
which affect one's self as well as those decisions which have an 
impact' on others.1119 Developing and asserting one's personal 
identity necessarily involves the capacity to affect others. 
Through interactions with others our personal identities unfold 
and manifest themselves. The Supreme Court has vindicated 
this dual impact of autonomous decision-making in the types of 
interests deemed protected by privacy.16o Thus, governmental 
action or intentional neglect which undermines autonomy over 
one's identity and decision-making impinges on privacy 
interests.161 
155. See text accompanying notes 151-154 supra, for language the Court uses to 
define what matters are protected by the right of privacy. 
156. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 MARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233, 236 (1977). 
157.ld. 
158. One commentator sees the central concern the courts seek to protect under the 
right of privacy as "the preservation of 'those attributes of an individual which are irre-
ducible in his selfhood.' " L. TRIBE, .AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 889 (1978) (quoting 
FREUND, 52 ALI ANNUAL MEETING, 42-43 (1975». 
159. Professor Tribe develops this idea by describing both inward and outward 
forms of privacy. L. TRIBE, supra note 158, at 888. 
160. Professor Tribe identifies child-rearing as one example. ld. Abortion and con-
traception also require decisions which affect not only the decision-maker, but also that 
person's partner, family, and society in general. 
161. The issue revolves around governmental interference with one's personality. 
According to Professor Tribe: 
The very idea of a fundamental right of personhood rests on 
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The marital rape exemption interferes with a woman's con-
trol over her life. By deliberately denying access to the criminal 
justice system to a woman who has been sexually assaulted by 
her husband, the state dictates her irrevocable consent to sexual 
relations with her husband. When the state decrees that a mar-
ried woman cannot bring rape charges against her husband, it 
denies her the autonomy to decide whether to undergo a partic-
ular experience. Important to this conclusion is the state's active 
prevention, through the marital rape exemption, of a woman's 
ability to exercise control over this part of her life. The marital 
rape exemption expressly rejects the notion that a woman 
should be able to determine for herself when she will consent to 
sexual intercourse with her husband. It does so by rendering her 
refusal ineffective and by allowing her husband to forcibly sexu-
ally assault her with impunity. Nullifying a woman's decision in 
this matter effectively usurps her control over this area of her 
life. Allowing a married woman to retain control over this deci-
sion would allow her to develop her personal identity and to as-
sert it in her immediate world, an essential aspect of control 
over one's life protected by the right of privacy.162 
Intimacy and Personal Identity 
Not all control over one's life is protected by the right of 
privacy. Reference to the intimate aspects of one's personal 
identity limits the notion of privacy and thus the right to 
unimpaired control over one's life.16s As previously noted, 
Griswold was concerned with a decision regarding the intimacies 
[d. at 890. 
the conviction that, even though one's identity is constantly 
and profoundly shaped by the rewards and penalties, the ex-
hortation and scarcities and constraints of one's social envi-
ronment, the 'personhood' resulting from this process is suffi-
ciently 'one's own' to be deemed fundamental in confrontation 
with the one entity that retains a monopoly over legitimate 
violence-the government. Thus active coercion by govern-
ment to alter a person's being or deliberate neglect by govern-
ment which permits a being to suffer, are conceived as quali-
tatively different from the passive, incremental coercion that 
shapes all of life and for which no one bears precise 
responsibility. 
162. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 158, at 888-90. 
163. One commentator stresses that, "[i]ntimacy is the chief restricting concept in 
the definition of privacy. • .-intimacy both in its relation to identity and, what is more 
subtle and complex, to autonomy." Gerety, supra note 156, at 263. 
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of a marital relationship. Ie. Fundamental life decisions which 
the Court has since protected under the rubric of privacy also 
implicate profoundly intimate concerns of life.1611 
Intimacy is closely connected to one's physical being. One's 
body and what one chooses to do with it necessarily reflect and 
comprehend one's personality.166 Control over one's body is one 
of the basic autonomies we experience as humans.167 Our physi-
cal integrity, then, embraces the notions of control, intimacy, 
and personal identity. Thus, the interest one maintains in one's 
bodily integrity is intrinsically a privacy interest.16S Some of the 
most important privacy cases have struck down laws which in-
fringed on a person's decisions regarding his or her body.169 The 
laws invalidated in these cases also had a severe impact on the 
intimate aspects of personality.170 
164. For a discussion of the right of privacy see text accompanying note 144 supra. 
165. For examples of some interests which have been accorded protection see text 
accompanying note 151 supra. 
166. Our bodies are "the most basic vehicle of [our] selfhood." Gerety, supra note 
156, at 266. 
167. Gerety notes that most of us take this form of control as a basic assumption in 
life and a "necessary condition" for all other forms of control by posing the question: "If 
we don't control our bodies, what do we control?" Id. 
168. "[P]hysical intrusion ••• , brings us to the core of our expectations and intu-
itions about privacy and hence of our rights to it." What is injured by physical intrusion 
is a "peculiar aspect of dignity and freedom invested in reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy." Id. at 265. 
169. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (decision whether to use contra-
ception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decision whether to obtain an abortion); 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975) (husband and parental consent not 
required to obtain abortion); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1976) (decision 
to obtain an abortion does not require parental consent). 
170. All of the cases cited in note 169 supra concerned governmental interference 
with a woman's decision regarding whether to conceive or carry a child to term. The 
impact of such a decision on one's life is surely inestimable and deeply personal. Profes-
sor Tribe comments that: "[o]f all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the 
most profound and intimate relate to •.. whether, where, and how one's body is to 
become the vehicle for another human being's creation." L. TRIBE, supra note 158, at 
921. To be subject to the state's regulation regarding this decision is to have one's per-
sonallife and identity irreversibly violated. Pointing out how central such a decision is to 
. self-definition, Professor Tribe observes: 
[i]f a man is the involuntary source of a child-if he is forbid-
den, for example, to practice contraception-the violation of 
his personality is profound; the decision that one wants to en-
gage in sexual intercourse but does not want to parent another 
human being may reflect the deepest of personal convictions. 
But if a woman is forced to bear a child-not simply to pro-
vide an ovum, but to carry the child to term-the invasion is 
incalculably greater. Quite apart from the physical experience 
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Similarly, the marital rape exemption violates a woman's in-
terest in her bodily integrity. The physical invasion of a forcible 
sexual assault takes from a person control over who one will al-
low to share in one's body-a decision which manifests one of 
the most intimate aspects of personal identity.l?l One commen-
tator suggests that the real importance of privacy to individuals 
is that only in a context of privacy, that is control over one's 
self, can essential relationships of love, trust, and respect flour-
ish.1'72 For one's sexuality to be a part of such relationships, one 
of pregnancy itself, an experience which of course has no ana-
logue for the male, there is the attachment the experience cre-
ates, partly physiological and partly psychological, between 
mother and child. Thus it is difficult to imagine a clearer case 
of bodily intrusion, even if the original conception was in some 
sense voluntary. 
ld. at 924. Pregnancy as a result of rape only heightens the intrusion. 
171. Gerety discusses two tort cases to emphasize that the "core expectation of pri-
vacy" is an expectation "of control over who, if anyone, will share in the intimacies of 
our bodies." One case involved the presence of a nonmedical observer during childbirth; 
the other case arose out of an incident in which the police took nude photographs of a 
victim of a crime, which they circulated among themselves. Gerety, supra note 156, at 
265-66. A forcible sexual assault presents an invasion of the intimacies of one's physical 
being which is strikingly stronger than these examples. If this sort of control is a central 
expectation of privacy, as discussed at notes 185-88, infra and accompanying text, then 
rape must violate the constitutionally protected areas of privacy. 
172. [P]rivacy is not just one possible means among others to in-
sure some other value, but. . . it is necessarily related to ends 
and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, 
friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique 
for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without 
privacy they are simply inconceivable. They require a context 
. of privacy or the possibility of privacy for their existence. To 
make clear the necessity of privacy as a context for respect, 
love, friendship and trust is to bring out also why a threat to 
privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as persons. To 
respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard our-
selves as the objects of love, trust, and affection is at the heart 
of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and pri-
vacy is·the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and ac-
tions, as oxygen is for combustion." 
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968). Fried notes that love, trust, and respect 
depend on recognizing that individuals are entitled to basic rights as persons, including 
the right to privacy, that cannot be unwillingly infringed upon by others. Respect is the 
manifestation of such recognition. Respect together with "a spontaneous relinquishment 
of certain entitlements of one's own" are the basic components of love. ld. at 480. In 
order to relinquish one's self one must be in control over access to one's self. ld. Trust is 
the expectation that others will respect you and your entitlement to yourself, and'your 
privacy. ld. at 481-82. The marital rape exemption allf>ws a woman's right to her body to 
be forcibly taken from her. Rape is a denial of a woman's right to herself and is a mani-
festation of disrespect. If a woman has no right to refuse sexual relations she does not 
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must have the freedom to decide for one's self when to share 
one's body and have the partner respect that decision.173 With-
out such control, those relationships in which one shares the in-
timacies of one's body with another diminish in love, trust, and 
respect because the ability to choose is limited. These sorts of 
relationships provide one with a significant and meaningful part 
of one's identity as a person. By denying a married woman the 
right to control an essential aspect of herself-her sexuality-in 
a relationship in which love, respect, and trust are intended to 
flourish, the state interferes with her control over the most inti-
mate aspects of her personality. 
Personal Effect of the Marital Rape Exemption 
The magnitude of the impact that the challenged law and 
the accompanying denial of choice have on an individual's life is 
one factor the Court has considered in privacy cases.174 In dis-
cussing why a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy is protected by the right of privacy, the Court in Roe 
observed: ' 
The detriment that the State would impose upon 
the pregnant woman by denying this choice alto-
gether is apparent. Specific and direct harm med-
ically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be 
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may 
force upon the woman a distressful life and fu-
ture. Psychological harm may be imminent. 
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child 
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, 
associated with the unwanted child, and there is 
the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to 
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the addi-
tional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed 
have control over this aspect of her life; sexual relations lose meaning as an integral part 
of a love relationship. In a relationship where one person does not respect the other's 
right to privacy and to control one's body, trust is destroyed. 
173. Forced sexual activity is hardly an expression of our sexuality nor is it an 
expression of love, trust, and respect. 
174. One author discusses this impact as one of the "tests" for finding a privacy 
interest, noting that the Court has phrased the right of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972), as "the right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.' " Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 
1161, 1175 (1974) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453) (emphasis in original). 
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motherhood may be involved.1'15 
Like pregnancy, abortion, and contraception, rape has a di-
rect and immediate, as well as a future, impact on a woman and 
her life. us Rape subjects a woman to physical and psychological 
harm. Contrary to some common notions/'17 being married to 
one's attacker may exacerbate, not reduce, the harm suffered by 
a rape victim. Not only is rape itself an act of physical violence, 
but spousal rape often occurs as part of a pattern of spousal 
abuse178 and, consequently, the rape may be accompanied by 
other acts of physical violence. One study of rape revealed that 
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. 
176. The impact of spousal rape affects many women's lives. 
It is estimated that more women are raped by their husbands 
each year than by strangers, acquaintances, or other friends 
and relatives. Of the estimated 2 million battered wives in the 
United States, at least one fifth are forced to have sex with 
their husbands as part of the beating. If rape by intimidation 
-the threat of violence-is included, the number of women 
raped by their husbands may actually be as high as 2 million, 
according to • . • domestic violence experts. 
Griffin, supra note 85, at 57. 
177. One commentator has assumed that "the possibilities of serious social, physical 
or mental harm from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace [sic] are rather small." 
Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, supra note 84, at 724. Another author 
reprinted a letter to the editor of the New York Times stating: 
'In the usual rape case, where it is a stranger who accosts a 
woman, not only is there physical abuse but the psychological 
effect constitutes a tremendous traumatic experience. In a sit-
uation where a husband compels his wife to have sexual inter-
course against her will, there cannot be the same traumatic 
experience. There may be resentment or injured feelings, but 
the overall effect cannot be compared to rape by a stranger.' 
Griffin, supra' note 85, at 59. At least one legislature has expressed this same notion by 
considering: 
The degree and nature of the victim's acquaintance with the 
actor as a mitigating circumstance • • • based on the theory 
that a person who resorts to sexual aggression against a female 
who has permitted previous sexual intercourse and who has 
thereby furnished to some extent an incentive to further 
amorous advances, presents less of a social danger than the 
person who commits sexual aggression against a female who is . 
not his voluntary social companion or with whom he has not 
been previously familiar. Moreover, a man who forces sexual 
intercourse in such situations does not deserve the same de-
gree of moral condemnation, as the male who forces sexual 
intercourse upon a female with whom he has little or no 
acquaintance. 
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-732 Legislative Comment (Supp. 1980). 
178. See generally Griffin, supra note 85. 
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the likelihood and the amount of violence used in rape increased 
when the victim and offender had a close relationship.1'19 The 
psychological and emotional trauma of rape may carry addi-
tional ramifications when the victim lives with her attacker. The 
woman may be subject to repeated attacks,180 her feelings of 
humiliation may be heightened by continue4 interaction with 
her attacker,181 and she may experience psychological confusion 
since her attacker is also supposedly her loving and beloved 
companion in life.182 The injury imposed by denying a woman 
control over this matter has a malignant impact on her and on 
her life. 
Privacy Implicates Rights of the Individual 
Although the Court first enunciated the right of privacy in a 
case involving a marital relationship,188 in Eisenstadt v. Baird 
the Court disavowed the idea that the right is premised on a 
marital relationship. Commenting on Griswold, the Eisenstadt 
Court noted: 
179. M. AMm, supra note 121, at 245. 
180. Griffin, supra note 85, at 59. Where a pattern of chronic sexual abuse exists, 
the woman may suffer many of the psychological and emotional difficulties associated 
with battered wives. For a discussion of the psychological patterns experienced by bat-
tered wives, see L. WALKER, supra note 124. 
181. 'When it's business as usual in -the morning, one's sense of 
violation is belittled. The victim of a rape by a stranger can 
have a sense of herself as a survivor of a violent crime. She has 
survived danger, is entitled to sympathy, and can try to avoid 
danger in the future. She can see the rapist as an enemy and 
direct her anger outward.' 
Griffin, supra note 85, at 59 (quoting from Address by clinical psychologist Barbara 
Cohn Schlachet, New York County Lawyers' Association, Forum on Marital Rape (Feb. 
1979». 
182. The situation is confused by the fact that the rapist husband 
also may, on occasion, be a loving husband with whom sexual 
intercourse may be pleasurable and affectionate. Furthermore, 
a wife may be so financially and emotionally dependent upon 
a rapist husband that she finds it difficult to perceive him as 
'the enemy' •.•• 
Id. at 59-60. 
While the rape may be experienced as a real violation, 
many women believe they have a 'duty' to be sexually accessi-
ble to their husbands at all times. They aren't convinced that 
they have a right to their anger • • • • [T]hese women often 
tum feelings of anger in on themselves, damaging their self-
esteem. They may believe they 'deserved' it because they re-
belled against their 'wifely duty.' 
183. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in 
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet 
the marital couple is not an independent entity 
with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa-
tion of two individuals each with a separate intel-
lectual and emotional makeup. If the right to 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual . .. . 1114 
The Court vindicated this notion, to some extent, in Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth,1811 which held that provisions in a state 
statute requiring, during the first trimester, a husband's consent 
to his wife's abortion and parental consent to a minor's abortion, 
unconstitutionally violated a woman's right of privacy. While 
recognizing· that the woman's decisions would affect her family, 
the Court concluded that the interests of the woman are signifi-
cantly more affected than those of her husband or her parent 
because she is the one who bears the child. Thus, a blanket veto 
by a third party would unconstitutionally violate her right of 
privacy. Justice Steven's concurrence in Bellotti v. Baird188 em-
phasized that inherent in the right of privacy is the right to 
make decisions "without public scrutiny and in defiance of the 
contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties. . . ."187 
For anyone to interfere with one's decision "is fundamentally at 
odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protec-
tion afforded to [one's] decision."188 
These cases suggest that what is protected by the right of 
privacy is the individual's decision regarding fundamental 
matters, separate from any marital or family relationship, even 
though such decisions may arise within the context of these rela-
tionships.189 This interpretation corresponds with the notion 
184. 405 u.s. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
185. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
186. 443 U.S. 622, 652 (1979). In Bellotti, the Court held that, because the state 
cannot allow a parent to veto a minor's abortion in the first trimester, if a state requires 
parental consent it must also provide an alternative. 
187. 443 U.S. at 655. 
188. ld. at 655-56. 
189. There is some controversy on this point. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1978), the Court stated that "the constitutionally protected privacy of 
the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing is ... concerned ••• 
with a protected intimate relationship." For a discussion of competing views on this 
point, see Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: 
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that privacy protects one's autonomy over the essentials of one's 
selfhood. If privacy means that a person as such has a distinctive 
value and cannot be used to further another's or society's 
ends/so then the ability to independently control the intimate 
aspects of one's life inheres in the concepts of privacy and per-
sonhood. A formulation of privacy which would protect a marital 
unit rather than an individual's rights within that relationship 
disregards basic premises of privacy by failing to recognize an 
individual's autonomy over selfhood. 
The interest threatened by marital rape is the woman's in-
terest in autonomous control over the intimacies of her body and 
her life. To suggest that the marital rape exemption protects the 
privacy of the marital relationship obscures the notion of pri-
vacy in several respects. Such a position rests on the fallacious 
premise that the family or marital unit provides protection for 
the privacy interests of the individual. But this is not true 
where, within an intimate relationship, one person's privacy 
rights are being violated by the other person, as is the case in 
forcible sexual assaults.1s1 Moreover, elevating the societal goal 
of protecting the family unit over that of the woman's right to 
autonomy not only sacrifices the woman's physical and mental 
well-being, but actually furthers the personal and individual 
goals of the husband. Thus, what is protected is not so much the 
marital relationship, but the dominant role of the man in that 
Beyond the Ideology 0/ Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 361 (1979). 
190. "The right to privacy expresses 'the moral fact that a person belongs to himself 
and notto others nor to society as a whole.''' Eichbaum, supra note 189, at 364 (quoting 
Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977». 
191. Eichbaum makes this point when she notes, "the implicit foundation of a fa-
milial privacy right is the dominant cultural myth of the family as 'haven in a heartless 
world': the family as a structure defining a private realm for the individual, as a source of 
privacy for the individual." Id. at 368. This is no longer true because the family often 
embodies the forces it tried to protect against. Consequently, a family-based right to 
privacy "rests the right of privacy on a structure which may no longer be able to support 
it." Id. at 369. A family-based right of privacy would effectively deny a woman autonomy 
over her body and her sexuality. 
Id. at 372. 
[A] family-based right would discriminate against individual 
members of the family unit itself by reducing their human sig-
nificance vis-a-vis the abstraction of which they are a part. A 
family-based right is premised upon the vision of a person as 
an instrumentality toward the higher goal of the abstract fam-
ily unit. It, therefore, violates basic principles of individual 
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relationship. 
A woman does not forfeit her right of privacy upon mar-
riage.192 But when this right is implicated within the context of 
marriage, as it is by the marital rape exemption, the Court 
might weigh the effect of a woman's decision on her husband as 
it did in Danforth. In Danforth, the court recognized that a hus-
band does have a strong interest in his wife's pregnancy, not 
only because of his interest in the fetus, but also because of his 
interest in the marriage, both of which would be profoundly 
affected by the wife's decision whether to have an abortion.19s 
Nevertheless, the court decided that "[i]nasmuch as it is the wo-
man who physically bears the child and who is the more directly 
and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, 
the balance weighs in her favor."I9" In the case of marital rape, 
however, a similar weighing process would be inappropriate. 
Whereas a man does have a legitimate interest in the decision 
whether or not to create a child, no one has an interest in raping 
another. 
C. MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AS AN UNDUE BURDEN 
Upon determining that the right of privacy protects a par-
ticular decision, constitutional analysis next requires examining 
the statute in question to ascertain whether it places an undue 
burden on the exercise of the right.195 To be unduly burden-
192. The Eisenstadt decision recognizes that persons maintain their separate identi-
ties in marriage, and that the right of privacy inheres in the individual. See discussion at 
note 152 supra, and accompanying text. 
193. We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and inter-
est that a. • • husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the 
growth and development of the fetus she is carrying . . . . 
Moreover, we recognize that the decision whether to undergo 
or to forego an abortion may have profound effects on the 
future of any marriage, effects that are both physical and 
mental, and possibly deleterious. 
428 U.S. at 69-70. 
194. 428 U.S. at 71. 
195. The right of privacy is not impermissibly infringed by narrowly tailored, care-
fully drafted regulations that meet permissible state interests. 
That the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to 
an individual's liberty to make choices regarding contracep-
tion does not, however, automatically invalidate every state 
regulation in this area. The business of manufacturing and 
selling contraceptives may be regulated in ways that do not 
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some, a regulation must infringe in some significant way on an 
individual's decision. Regulations absolutely prohibiting a deci-
sion or "substantially limiting access to the means of effectuat-
ing that decisionU196 have been held unduly burdensome.197 
Rape laws provide the means through which a woman pro-
tects her right to control sexual access to her body.19s Because a 
woman has such a right, society, through the criminal justice 
system, does not permit others to violate it. The marital rape 
exemption burdens a married woman's decision regarding con-
trol of her body and sexuality by denying her access to the crim-
inal justice system. Without such access, her decision not to en-
gage in sexual intercourse with her husband is ineffectual. 
In Danforth, the Court held that a statutory provision 
granting a husband veto power over his wife's decision to have 
an abortion unduly burdened a woman's constitutionally pro-
tected decision.199 The Court interpreted such a provision as giv-
ing greater weight to a husband's interest than to the woman's, 
and thus "interposed an absolute obstacle to a woman's deci-
sion."20o Under the marital rape exemption, a husband may 
override his wife's decision regarding sexual access to her body 
without suffering any of the legal consequences which usually 
ensue to enforce a woman's decision. By permitting a husband to 
control his wife's body in this regard, the marital rape exemp-
tion places his interests above hers. Because she is denied the 
means to effectuate her decisism, her husband's decision governs. 
This sort of interference presents a woman with an absolute ob-
infringe protected individual choices. 
Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977) (emphasis added). "[T]he 
right [in Roe] protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her free-
dom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Maher V. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 
(1977). 
196. Carey V. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. at 688. 
197. The statute in Griswold, banning the use of contraceptives, is an example of a 
statute which absolutely prohibits a decision. The statute in Carey, which restricted the 
distribution of contraceptives to minors, and distribution by anyone other than a li-
censed physician is an example of a statute which substantially restricts access to the 
means of implementing a decision. 
198. Rape leaves a woman "with little retaliatory capability save that provided by 
law-to charge her attacker so that a civilized society may lawfully exact a just penalty 
or punishment for the trespass committed." State V. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 222, 372 
A.2d 386, 390 (1977). 
199. 428 U.S. 52 (1975). 
200. ld. at 70-71 n.ll. 
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stacle to her decision and is therefore unduly burdensome. 
D. STATE INTERESTS 
A regulation imposing an undue burden on a decision pro-
tected by the right of privacy may be ·validated only if the regu-
lation voices a "compelling state interest" and IS "narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."201 
The state must show that the means chosen in the statute actu-
ally promote a compelling state interest.202 If the relationship 
between the means and the purpose is speculative, under-
inclusive, or overinclusive, the statute is unlikely to withstand 
the required scrutiny. 
It might be argued that the state has a compelling interest 
in protecting the institution of marriage by fostering the intima-
cies of the marital relationship203 and encouraging reconciliation. 
The sexual intimacies of a marriage are an integral part of the 
institution of marriage and subjecting them to possible criminal 
sanctions would have a debilitating effect on the marital rela-
tionship. Fear of rape charges might destroy the sexual relation-
ship of the couple. Additionally, a rape charge poses a substan-
tial threat to a marriage; divorce, not reconciliation, is likely to 
ensue. 
But these assertions misconceive the basic nature of a forci-
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. 
202. In discussing the state interests in Roe, the Court emphasized the importance 
of a proveable factual relationship between the asserted state goals of protecting human 
life and the health of the mother and the legislative means, prohibiting abortions. The 
Court noted that the question of when life begins is debatable and would not permit the 
legislature to pick one of the speculative theories to infringe on the right of the woman 
to decide to terminate her pregnancy. Further, the Court held that the state interest in 
the health of the mother was not compelling until after the first trimester because in the 
first trimester mortality rates from abortions are less than mortality rates in childbirth. 
410 U.S. at 149-62. 
203. [T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential 
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institu-
tion which the State not only must allow, but which always 
and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is one thing 
when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital 
sexuality. • • or to say who may marry, but it is quite another 
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies in-
herent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal 
law the details of that intimacy. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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ble sexual assault. In State v. Smith the court correctly ob-
served: "Rape is necessarily and essentially an act of male self-
aggrandizement, while sexual communion mutually entered into 
connotes and communicates love, respect and a gift of physical 
pleasure. Rape subjugates and humiliates the woman ... . "204 
Recent studies disclose rape to be an act of violence not sexual-
ity.20I5 The rapist uses sexual acts to express hostility, aggression, 
and dominance.2oB Marital rape is a manifestation of these same 
motivations.207 Thus rape is not one of the intimacies of the 
marital relationship. 
In Danforth, the Court recognized that allowing a husband 
to veto his wife's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy did not further the state's interest in protecting a marital 
relationship.208 Acknowledging that a marriage in which the 
couple is divided on such an immensely important issue is not 
harmonious or successful, the Court concluded that to permit a 
husband to override his wife's decision would do little to en-
hance or salvage the marriage. Although a woman's decision to 
have an abortion when her husband disagrees would have a dele-
terious effect on the marriage, granting a husband an absolute 
204. 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389-90. 
205. Inaccurate notions surrounding rape "assume that the offender's behavior is 
primarily motivated by sexual desire and that rape is directed toward gratifying only 
this sexual need. Quite to the contrary, careful clinical study of offenders reveals that 
rape is in fact serving primarily nonsexual needs. It is the sexual expression of power and 
anger. Forcible sexual assault is motivated more by retaliatory and compensatory mo-
tives than by sexual ones." A GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE 2 (1979). 
206. [d. at 12-13. 
207. The marital rapist uses sex to assert powers over his wife by forcing her to 
submit to him. Through submission he also degrades and humiliates her, which expresses 
his anger and contempt for her. [d. at 177-79. 
208. It seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the wife and 
her husband. No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or 
successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided 
on so important and vital an issue. But it is difficult to believe 
that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, 
and of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage 
institution will be achieved by giving the husband a veto 
power exerciseable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason 
at all. Even if the State had the ability to delegate to the hus-
band a power it itself could not exercise, it is not at all likely 
that such action would further, as the District Court majority 
phrased it, the 'interest of the state in protecting the mutual-
ity of decisions vital to the marriage relationship." 
428 U.S. at 71. 
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veto over her decision would be equally deleterious to the 
marriage. 
Similarly, a woman's decision to withhold her consent to 
sexual relations could arguably have an adverse effect on the 
marriage. The husband's rape of his wife, however, is likely to 
have an even more pernicious effect on the marriage. In fact, 
marital rape, which negates any notion of mutual, consenting, 
and loving behavior, might symbolize the ultimate breakdown of 
a marriage.209 Thus the. Court's observation in Danforth regard-
ing the effect of a husband's absolute veto over his wife's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy, that "it is difficult to believe 
that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and 
of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage insti-
tution will be achieved,"210 similarly applies to giving a husband 
immunity to rape his wife. 
Moreover, the state does not have a legitimate interest in 
sheltering the perpetrators of violent crimes under the guise of 
protecting the marital relationship. Justice Harlan's famous dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman,211 after setting forth a married couple's 
right of privacy surrounding their sexual relationship, went on to 
note that: "'[T]he family ... is not beyond regulation' ... , 
and it would be an absurdity to suggest either that offenses may 
not be committed in the bosom of the family or that the home 
can be made a sanctuary for crime. "212 The marital rap~ exemp-
tion commits just this absurdity. Other crimes committed be-
tween husband and wife are not exempted from criminal prose-
cution based on the marital relationship.213 The consideration 
which has distinguished marital rape, that rape involves the sex-
ual relationship of the couple, ignores the true nature of the 
209. "[R]econciliation hardly seems an expected or likely. consequence of a relation-
ship that has deteriorated to the point of forcible sexual advances by a husband." State 
v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389. 
210. 428 U.S. at 71. 
211. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). This case preceded Griswold and upheld a Connecti-
cut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples. JuStice Harlan's 
dissent anticipated and became the basis for the Griswold decision. Justice Goldberg'S 
concurrence in Griswold cited with approval Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. 381 U.S. at 
495. 
212. 367 U.S. at 552 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943». 
213. See e.g., Goodwin v. State, 114 Wis. 318, 90 N.W. 170 (1902) (husband prose-
cuted for assault with intent to kill his wife). 
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crime and the harm inflicted. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The marital rape exemption is predicated on the ancient no-
tions that a woman is the property of a man, and in particular, 
that a husband has the right to own and control his wife. These 
concepts have long been repudiated. A wife is no longer the legal 
chattel of her husband. The normative view of marriage today, 
in both the law and society, is that of a partnership between two 
equals. The protection of women from violent, unwanted as-
saults is the purpose of rape laws. The marital rape exemption 
contradicts this purpose and continues to incorporate the notion 
of a woman as the property of her husband in modern rape stat-
utes. The legal justifications for the exemption are based on fac-
tually and legally suspect assumptions. 
The apparent unwillingness of most legislatures to eliminate 
the exemption indicates a need to challenge the exemption in 
the courts. The right of privacy is one argument available for 
securing the right of a married woman to control her body. . 
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